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COMMENTS
CREDIT CARDS AND THE VIRTUAL ACCEPTANCE
FREDERIcK M. HART*

A recent case1 decided in a lower New York court indicates an
interesting use of the virtual acceptance. Neither the decision nor the
opinion is of great import, but the case is noteworthy because of the
theory advocated by the plaintiff which shows a clever (and successful) attempt to adapt a principle developed during the last century to
a modern type of credit transaction. In addition, it furnishes an opportunity to discuss a significant change made by the Uniform Commercial Code in the field of Negotiable Instruments.
The action was brought by the financer of a credit club to collect
obligations incurred by a credit card user. The credit plan, a tripartite
contract, involved the following parties: the Esquire Club, Gale Creations which was a "company member" of the club, and Kass, an employee of Gale Creations who had been issued a card by the club in
accordance with the arrangement. Gale Creations having become insolvent, collection was attempted from Kass who had made the
purchases.
When the credit card was delivered to Kass, who was termed a
"designated card holder," he was required to sign it, thereby subjecting
himself to the regulations of the club. One of these, important to a
determination of the case, stated:
"Company Member agrees to pay for all charges incurred
by its designated card holders and each of the card holders
agrees to pay all charges incurred by him, and they agree
to accept all drafts drawn on them for charges incurred by
or in their behalf., [Emphasis supplied.]
The usual process of collecting followed by the club proceeded
as follows: The original supplier of goods or services would prepare
a club draft which showed the amount of the card holder's purchase
and directed him to pay the indicated charges "to Esquire Club, or
order, of Franklin National Bank." This draft was addressed to the
purchaser, Kass, in the instant case, but forwarded to the Esquire
Club which apparently paid the supplier from its own resources. The
* Professor of Law, Union University, Albany Law School. B.S. 1951, LL.B. 1955,
Georgetown University; LL.M. 1956, New York University.
1 Franklin National Bank v. Kass, 19 Misc. 2d 280, 184 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct.
1959), noted, 1959 Survey of N.Y. Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1442, 1454 (1959).

2 Id. at 281, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
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Esquire Club then "negotiated" the instrument to the Franklin National Bank which, after having it photographed, mailed the original
to the purchaser. The draft also contained the instruction, "If incorten (10) days. Otherwise, retention conrect, please return ' within
3
stitutes acceptance.
In the case, Franklin National Bank v. Kass,4 the defendant had
used his Esquire credit card for various purchases and a number of
club drafts had been prepared and sent to him in accordance with the
billing technique. Upon his failure to pay, this action was brought
by the bank to whom the instruments had been transferred. Plaintiff's
theory was neither that the defendant had breached his promise to
pay, nor that he had breached his promise to accept, but rather was
grounded in the assertion that the drafts were negotiable bills of
exchange upon which the defendant was primarily liable because he
had actually accepted them.
Two possibilities existed for a finding of an acceptance. It could
be reasoned that the purchaser, by signing the credit card and agreeing
to the club rules, promised to accept all drafts drawn upon him, and
such was equivalent under section 135 of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law5 to an actual acceptance. Or, it might be argued
that retention of the drafts beyond the specified ten day period was
sufficient to constitute a constructive acceptance. The court chose the
former theory, granting relief to the plaintiff on the ground of actual
acceptance.
Collateral acceptances 6 gave rise to considerable litigation in this
country during the nineteenth century. Although recognized in England at a relatively early date,7 they were never favored, both the
virtual8 and extrinsic acceptance9 eventually being abolished. Following the lead of Chief Justice Marshall in Coolidge v. Payson,10 American courts have been more sympathetic with their use, their main
3 Id. at 282, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
4 19 Misc. 2d 280, 184 N.Y.S.2d 783 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
5 N.Y. Negotiable Inst. Law § 223 (1909).
6 "Collateral acceptance" is a general term used to designate any acceptance off
the face of an instrument. Within its meaning are contained the "extrinsic" acceptance
(an acceptance off the instrument subsequent to its issuance) and "virtual" acceptances
(acceptances off the face prior to the instrument's issuance).
7 Wilkinson v. Lutwidge, 1 Str. 649, 93 Eng. Rep. 758 (1726); Britton, Bills and
Notes § 174 (1943).
8 Pierson v. Dunlap, 2 Cowp. 571, 98 Eng. Rep. 1246 (1777). The virtual acceptance had a life span of only nine years as it had been first recognized in 1765. Pillans
& Roses v. Van Mierop & Hopkins, 3 Burr 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. (1765).
9 The extrinsic acceptances had a somewhat longer life. It was abolished by
statute in 1794. Stat. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, §§ 4 & 5 (1794).
10 15 U.S. (2 Wheat) 66 (1817).
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concern being the extent to which limitations should be placed upon
acceptance off the face of an instrument.
Prior to the NIL, little uniformity existed among the states in
the reception afforded to the collateral acceptance, or in the stringency
with which there were to be imposed requirements that the promise
be in writing, unconditional and definite in its description of the drafts.
Nor was there complete agreement as to whether reliance upon the
promise to accept was an essential element of the holder's case. The
adoption of the NIL settled some questions, generally limiting the use
of the collateral acceptance. However, sufficient latitude remained to
preclude any real uniformity."
New York consistently has taken a liberal approach to such
acceptances, 12 and the Kass case, although perhaps a little surprising
because of its novel facts, is not repugnant to the general tenor of cases
in this jurisdiction. However, in other jurisdictions governed by the
NIL, the decision is subject to doubt both because of the conditional
nature of the promise to accept and to the complete failure of the
promise to identify the drafts to be drawn.' 3 A contrary decision
would be required in those states governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, since the Code has abolished all acceptances off the face of
the instrument.' 4
A basic proposition of the law of commercial paper, that no person
is liable on an instrument unless he has signed it,'5 is the principal
objection to recognition of the collateral acceptance.' The reason
for the rule is clear, being, in fact, closely linked with the theory of
negotiability itself. Negotiable instruments, designed to be as much
like cash as possible, have an intrinsic value of their own which is
distinct and separate from the liabilities arising from any underlying
or collateral transaction. In order that they be freely negotiable, as
property valuable in their own right, their worth, as well as the rights
and liabilities of the parties, must be ascertainable from a mere inspection of the instrument itself-no need should exist to go beyond the
four corners of the paper. Only two risks are taken by one purchasing
11

Finklestein, Acceptances and Promises to Accept, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 685 (1926).

12 Merchants' Bank v. Griswold, 72 N.Y. 472 (1878); Burns v. Rowland, 40 Barb.

363 (N.Y. 1863); Ulster County Bank v. McFarlan, 5 Hill 432 (N.Y. 1843); 3 Denio
553 (N.Y. 1846).
13 First Nat'l Bank v. Clark, 61 Md. 400 (1883); Lonsdale v. Lafayette Bank, 18
Ohio 126 (1849); Wauchula Development Co. v. Peoples Stock Yard Bank, 86 Fla. 298,
93 So. 220 (1923).
14 UCC § 3-410.

15 NIL § 18. This Act presently makes an exception to the general precept in
favor of collateral acceptances. NIL §§ 134 & 135.
16 UCC § 3-410, Comment No. 3 (1958 Ed.). See also Finklestein, supra note 11.
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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW

as a holder in due course, that the instrument may not be genuine
and that the obligated parties may not be willing and able to pay.
Where the liability of a person depends, as it does in all cases involving
collateral acceptances, not upon a promise made in the instrument, but
upon a completely separate promise, a holder's rights are no longer
determinable from a mere inspection of the instrument.
In spite of this theoretical argument against the collateral acceptance, it may be urged that if business practices show a need for
acceptances off the face of drafts, they should be tolerated as a useful
exception to a general precept. So long as the exception does not
adversely affect the motivating purpose of the law, it need not be
condemned. From the paucity of litigation during the past twentyfive years involving virtual and extrinsic acceptances, it seems doubtful that substantial legal problems remain unsettled in this area.
Thus, the change wrought by the Uniform Commercial Code, in repudiating the collateral acceptance, may appear as a needless and
arbitrary legal restriction upon the commercial community.
The answer to this is that the collateral acceptance is of little
practical value. The Code does not disturb the right of a party to sue
upon the promise to accept itself.' 7 It only states that the promise to
accept no longer constitutes an actual acceptance. This being true, an
advantage is gained by the holder where he can treat the promise as
an actual acceptance only if by doing so his rights are thereby enlarged
or his burden of proof lightened. Generally, there are two advantages
gained by suing on a negotiable instrument, personal defenses (equitable defenses) of the defendant are unavailable against him and there
exists a presumption of consideration in his favor.'
Where the holder sues for breach of a promise to accept a draft,
he enjoys the same benefits. They arise, however, not because of any
theory of negotiable instruments law, but from the very nature of the
promise. This promise is separate and distinct from the underlying
transaction giving rise to the draft and whether the drawee-promisor
has a personal defense to an action brought either on the draft or
upon the underlying transaction is irrelevant in a suit grounded upon
the promise to accept.' 9
17 UCC § 3-410, Comment No. 3.
18 There may also be a question of whether the quantum of damages recoverable
differs. It has been noted elsewhere that if a difference does exist, suit upon the promise
to accept would result in greater damages because the possibility of recovering for
anticipatory breaches would exist. Finklestein, supra note 11, at 719.
19 Clinch Co. Bank v. Wyatt-Proch Lumber Co., 82 Pa. Sup. 309, 308 (1923).
"The fallacy of the contention of counsel [that a failure of consideration in the underlying transaction defeated a holder's suit against one who promised to accept] . . .
seems to be due to his apparent conception that the suit was on the draft, whereas It
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The presumption of consideration, or a satisfactory substitute,
is no more difficult to find. Once again, it should be noted that the
plaintiff's rights in such an action depend only upon the defendant's
liabilities incurred by his promise to accept, not upon the underlying
transaction. The consideration given by a holder for this promise to
accept is his reliance thereupon. ° This may be compared to the
consideration found for an accommodation indorser's promise to be
secondarily liable on a negotiable instrument. 1 Since reliance upon
the virtual or extrinsic acceptance is required under the NIL,22 the
need of the plaintiff to show it in an action brought for breach of
defendant's promise to accept is no additional burden.
The Kass case, although indicating a large area in which the
virtual acceptance may have use, furnishes evidence in favor of its
abolishment rather than retention. In this case the sole purpose of
the plaintiff in alleging an acceptance appears to be his plan to use it
as a collection device. Such a purpose is deplorable. The only place
of the virtual acceptance, if it has a place at all, is in business transactions where the promise to accept is made consciously by one understanding, at least generally, its implications. Hidden, as it was, in this
case, among other "club regulations" where the word "accept" might
have many meanings to the layman, it seems unfair to hold the
promisor liable under the technical rules of negotiable instruments
law.
was on the contract growing out of the letter [in which the defendant promised to
accept the draft]." Contra, Renfrow v. Citizens State Bank, 87 Ind. App. 318, 158 N.E.
919 (1927). It should be noted that in both of these cases the suit was brought by
the payee of the instrument, not by a transferee from him.
20 See, Nelson v. First Natl Bank, 48 IMI. 36 (1868), and Clinch Co. Bank v.
Wyatt-Proch Lumber Co., supra note 19.
21 Britton, Bills and Notes § 364 (1943).
.2 NIL §§ 134 & 135.

